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Inadequac.y of the Pleadin.qs as a Basis for Trial.
IT has been the traditional theory of our law that the pleadings con-
stitute a necessary, and at the same time a sufficient and satisfactory,
basis for the trial or hearing of the ease. Their function is to set
forth the contentions of the parties in such a way as to fully disclose
the nature and scope of the controversy.
In the system of pleading employed at common law there were
a number of glaring departures from this ideal, such as the rule
which permitted affirmative defenses to be shown under general
issues without the slightest warning to the plaintiff, and the rule
authorizing the use of the vague conclusions of the common counts
which gave no intimation of the real issues. But it nevertheless
was the general design that every assertion of either party should
be met by an admission or denial from the other, so that an inspection
of the pleadings would make it possible to ascertain exactly what
each party would be required to prove in order to prevail. By con-
fining the trial within the issues raised in the pleadings, the law
sought to enable each party to prepare his case with full confidence
that he would neither be surprised by unexpected evidence from
his adversary nor be burdened with the expense of assembling un-
necessary proof. But this highly desirable aim has never been
possible of realization, and pleadings have never offered and never
can offer a satisfactory basis for the trial. There are two reasons
for this.
In the first place, allegations in pleadings are required to deal
with facts of a generalized type, known as material or ultimate
facts, and not with evidence. How these ultimate facts will be
proved at the trial cannot be determined from the pleadings. If
proof of one kind were to be offered, certain evidence would be
necessary to meet it, whereas to oppose proof of another kind an
entirely different line of evidence might be necessary. For example,
the allegation of a promise by the defendant might be proved in
any one of a dozen' different ways-by letters, by telegrams, by
oral conversations, through the act of an agent, by ratification;
but the defendant can form no idea from the pleading which kind
of evidence will be used, and the less the claim rests upon a founda-
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tion of fact, the more difficult will be the task of preparing evidence
to meet it.
In the second place, since he is free to claim what he will, a
pleader may allege many things that he knows may not or cannot
be proved. This may be due either to abundant caution in assert-
ing every possible fact in behalf of his client, or to a more or less
definite design, well understood and highly regarded in military
circles, of concealing the real point of attack by a show of activity
on a wide front. But whatever the motive, the effect is the same.
The other party has no way of determining from the pleadings
what facts will actually become the subjects of proof and what
will be merely ignored at the trial.
The same double uncertainty inheres, for obvious reasons, in the
denials which the pleader employs. In the first place, denials are
no more concrete than the allegations to which they are directed,
and it is therefore impossible to know in advance .what sort of
evidence will be employed in their support. In the second place,
they may or may not be used for the bona fide purpose of contesting
the truth of all the allegations denied. Whether general or specific
in terms they are likely to present numerous issues which, although
material on their face, will be found at the trial to be entirely
fictitious. In such a case the party having the burden of proof will
be loaded with the useless expense of proving or preparing to prove
facts which his adversary has no actual intention of disputing.
Because of these characteristics of pleading, by virtue of which
assertions and denials may be set up with no indication either as
to the manner in which they will be supported by proof nor even
as to which of them will be supported at all, counsel are faced with
a disagreeable dilemma in preparing for trial with no guide but
the pleadings.
If a lawyer undertakes so to prepare his case as to meet all the
possible items of proof which his adversary may bring out at the
trial, or to meet all the assertions and denials which his adversary
has spread upon the record, much of his effort will inevitably be
misdirected and will result only in futile expense. If, on the other
hand, he restricts his preparation to such matters as he thinks his
adversary will be likely to rely upon, he will run the risk of being
a victim of surprise.
Furthermore, from the beginning until the end, the question of
settlement is always involved in a litigated case. Indeed, one of
the greatest uses of judicial procedure is to bring parties to a point
where they will seriously discuss settlement. But the pleadings
seldom disclose a basis upon which a settlement can be reached.
It is not what a party asserts, but what he can establish by proof,
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that determines the strength of his position, and so long as each
party is ignorant of what his opponent will be able to prove, their
negotiations have nothing substantial to rest upon. Many a case
would be settled, to the advantage of the parties and to the relief
of the court, if the true situation could be disclosed before the trial
begins.
Is there any way of bridging this gap between what is set up
in the pleadings and what will come out in evidence? It is of course
important to know in advance the nature and extent of your adver-
sary's claims. This knowledge is given by the pleadings. But it
is equally important, in preparing your proof, to know what proof
your adversary will be able to present in support of his claims and
in opposition to yours. This knowledge the pleadings do not give.
The allegations and denials in the pleadings point only to the results
which the pleader may wish to establish by his proof. They give
little or no notice of the nature of that proof. How can one effec-
tively prepare to meet the proof to be offered by his adversary if
he has no reliable knowledge as to what that proof will be?
As a contribution toward the solution of this difficulty, the
common law, after six or seven centuries of indifference or incom-
petence, came forward with the feeble and restricted bill of par-
ticulars. Through this device it proposed, in a limited class of
cases, to prevent surprise at the trial by forcing the pleader to give
such additional information as a "reasonable man" would require
for the adequate preparation of his defense.
But although the bill of particulars was not strictly considered
a part of the pleadings, neither was it strictly considered an exhibit
of evidence. It was necessary, as learned judges said, for the Bill
of particulars to "fairly apprise the opposite party . . . of the
nature of the evidence to be offered", but at the same time, as learned
judges also said, it was not necessary for the particulars "to dis-'
close the specific evidence upon which a party relies for recovery." I
The bill of particulars supplemented the pleading with details which
the pleading failed to give, but it fell short of a real disclosure of
evidence and to that extent it furnished an inadequate basis for
preparation for trial.
There was also the ancient practice of profert and oyer, with its
counterpart of exhibits in equity, which compelled the pleader to
disclose the deeds or other documents upon which his action was
founded. But this kind of disclosure, although it was good as far
as it went and has been preserved by many modern statutes, is
obviously too restricted in scope to offer any general relief to parties
who are in doubt as to what they must prepare to meet on the trial.




Equity, which ought to have done better, refused even to recog-
nize the problem as a legitimate subject of judicial concern. Bills
in equity were, it is true, designed for the purpose of obtaining
discovery as well as relief, and bills of discovery were used in aid
of actions at law. In bills of both kinds interrogatoqies were set
forth to which the defendant was required to make specific answers.
But the discovery which was sought in equity was not of the type
now under consideration. It was discovery of evidence which the
pleader wished to obtain in support of his own case, not discovery
regarding the case which his opponent might put up against him.
Such discovery was not sought in order to protect himself from
surprise at the trial, nor to enable him to avoid futile preparation
to meet anticipated proof which the other party might never pre-
sent' The discovery provided by equity was nothing but a method
by which the pleader obtained admissions from his adversary
regarding matters which he himself, and not the adversary, was
required to prove.
In answering the various interrogatories set up in the bill, it
sometimes happened that the defendant gave incidental informa-
tion from which the plaintiff could determine what the defendant's
evidence would probably be. And the charging part of the bill is
said to have been sometimes employed as a sort of fishing device
in which the pleader, by way of anticipation, set up defensive mat-
ters which he supposed the defendant might rely upon, together
with the circumstances by which he himself expected to meet such
matters, in the hope that the answer of the defendant regarding
these anticipated defenses would disclose something useful regard-
ing the defendant's case.2 But all of this was outside the purpose
of the discovery in which equity was interested. That purpose was
to aid a party in assembling his own evidence, not in meeting the
evidence of his adversary.
This theory, that discovery should be available only for attack
but never for defense, was no inadvertence on the part of the
chancery judges. It was the result of a definite purpose, and every
effort to extend the scope of the remedy was met by a judicial
opposition which never relaxed.
Sir John Wigram, who made the first notable study of Discovery
a hundred years ago, stated the case quite clearly. He said:
"If it were now, for the first time, to be determined, whether, in the inves-
tigation of disputed facts, truth would best be elicited by allowing each of
2. MITFORD, PLEADINGS IN CHANCERY (5th Am. ed. 1844) 43.
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the contending parties to know, before the trial, in what manner, and by
what evidence, his adversary proposed to establish his own case; argu-
ments of some weight might a priori be adduced in support of the affirm-
ative of this important question. Experience, however, has shown-or (at
least) courts of justice in this country act upon the principle-that the
possible mischiefs of surprise at the trial are more than counterbalanced
by the danger of perjury, which must inevitably be incurred, when either
party is permitted, before a trial, to know the precise evidence against
which he had to contend; and, accordingly by the settled rules of courts
of justice in this country (approved as well as acknowledged) each party
has thrown upon him the onus of supporting his own case, and meeting
that of his adversary, without knowing beforehand by what evidence the
case of his adversary is to be established or his own opposed." 3
This statement throws much light on the chancery attitude to-
ward a broader discovery. It is obvious that Wigram wants to say,
and indeed attempts to suggest, that experience has shown the im-
practicability of extending discovery so as to cover the evidence
which one's opponent is to use in his own behalf. But since English
courts never had any experience at all in the matter, he is able to
go no farther than the assertion that they have not so extended it
The mischiefs of surprise at the trial he admits, but he takes com-
fort in the reflection that, by enduring those ills, we have escaped
the far more serious and sinister dangers of perjury which would
overwhelm us if parties were permitted to know what their adver-
saries were prepared to prove.
Perjury is one of the great bugaboos of the law. Every change
in procedure by which the disclosure of the truth has been made
easier has raised the spectre of perjury to frighten the profession.
It was only in 1851 that Lord Brougham's Act for the first time
made the parties to civil actions competent to testify in the higher
courts of England.4 There was great dread of the Act, lest the
interest of the parties should prove too powerful an incentive to
false swearing. Lord Campbell wrote in his journal on June 19,
1851:
"It [the bill] is opposed, as might be expected, by the lord chancellor.
If it passes, it will create a new era in the administration of justice in
this country. I support it, and I think it will be carried, although all the
common law judges, with one exception, are hostile to it." 5
But the fear that the temptation to perjury would ruin the value
of the testimony of interested parties has so completely vanished
that no one would seriously think of restoring the disqualification.
3. WIGRAMi ON DISCOvERY (1842) § 347.
4. 14 & 15 VIGr. c. 99 (2) (1851).
5. 2 HARncAsTLE's LIwE oF LoRD CAiPBELL (1881) 292.
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The exclusion of the testimony of an interested survivor has been
based on the fear of perjury. Courts have repeatedly and solemnly
declared that where death has closed the lips of one party the law
will close the lips of the other, for the tendency to perjury would
be so great, were the survivor permitted to speak, that public senti-
ment would not tolerate the resulting peril to the estates of the
dead." But Connecticut,7 Massachusetts 8 and Rhode Island " have
all removed the disqualification, and the estates of the dead seem
to be in no more danger in those states than elsewhere.
The true safeguard against perjury is not to refuse to permit
any inquiry at all, for that will eliminate the true as well as the
false, but the inquiry should be so conducted as to separate and
distinguish the one from the other, where both are present. That
task, however, chancery refused to undertake. The possibility of
perjury was thought to be enough to condemn any attempt to extend
the field of discovery so as to inform the respective parties what
they would be called upon to meet at the trial.
If one were critically to examine this legal hobgoblin of perjury
he might perhaps find reason to believe that it was not actually so
terrifying to the profession as they pretended. It is easy for
those who are interested in opposing change to conjure up visions
of calamities which the change will precipitate, and to persuade
themselves of the reality of the dangers which serve so useful a
purpose as a deterrent from the course which they disapprove.
It may well be doubted whether the chancery bar really wanted
to liberalize the practice. An acquired technique always develops
resistance to change. But it is also to be observed, in the present
instance, that the restrictions upon discovery not only produced
an enormous amount of lucrative litigation over the application of
the rules, which the reported cases abundantly show, but they pre-
served enough uncertainty in the trial of cases so that a lawyer
might always feel confident of having a fighting.chance of success
no matter what side of any case he might be employed to represent.
6. Harris v. Bank of Jacksonville, 22 Fla. 501, 506-7, 1 So. 140, 143 (1886);
Louis v. Easton, 50 Ala. 570 (1873) ; Owens v. Owens, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878);
Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297, 304-5 (1870).
7. PuB. ACTS (1848) c. 44, which removed the disqualification of witnesses on
the ground of interest in the action, was held to permit an interested survivor
to testify in an action by or against the decedent's estate. PuB. ACTS (1850)
c. 3, undertook to provide a reciprocal protection to the decedent's estate by
allowing entries and written memoranda of the decedent to be introduced in
evidence.. This was later enlarged to include oral declarations. The two statutes
are found in CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5582, 5608, and are to be read together.
See Rowland v. Philadelphia, M. & B. Rr., 63 Conn. 415, 28 Atl. 102 (1893).
8. MASS. STAT. (1870) c. 393.
9. R. I. GEN. LAWS (1896) c. 244, § 35.
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The ancient restrictions upon discovery have met with much
criticism in modern times. The need for better information in
advance of the trial has been more and more keenly felt as time
and expense have become increasingly important economic factors
in litigation. Discovery of one's own evidence seldom requires the
aid of a court, although a convenient procedure for that purpose
ought always to be available in case of need. But information
regarding the course which can or will be taken by one's adversary
is an almost universal necessity if the merits of the case are to be
fully presented, if preparation is to be facilitated, and if the trial
is not to be confused and encumbered with useless matters. Unless
litigation can be conducted under such reasonably favorable cir-
cumstances as to make it a legitimate business risk instead of a
lottery, modern business men will decline to use it, and whenever
possible will either arbitrate, settle by direct negotiation, or simply
charge off the loss. Efforts to modernize discovery have been
directed along two lines, namely, enlarging its scope and improv-
ing its mechanics.
Scope of Modern Discovery
A wide variation in the scope of discovery is found among
American jurisdictions. In some states the ancient chancery
tradition has retained so powerful a hold on the profession that
discovery has undergone practically no change, and the same re-
strictions which were enforced by the chancellors a hundred years
ago still operate to keep the parties in ignorance of the matters
they will be called upon to meet at the trial.
In Connecticut, for example, it was enacted in 1836 that parties
in civil actions might on motion obtain such disclosure of facts or
documents "as a court of equity might order".10 In 1889 this was
amended to allow discovery of facts or documents "material to the
support or defense of the suit"," but it was held that this did not
enlarge the scope of disclosure, and the equity rule still obtained
that a party was entitled to discovery of only such facts as were
"necessary to his own title . . . for he is not at liberty to pry
into the title of the adverse party".'- In 1931 the statute was again
amended, by permitting the court, on motion of either party, to
order disclosure of facts or documents "material to the mover's
cause of action or defense". 3 This re-enacts the equity rule in
10. STAT. OF CONN. (1838) p. 76.
11. CONN. PUB. AcTs (1889) c. 22.
12. Downie v. Nettleton, 61 Conn. 593, 595-6, 24 Atl. 977, 978 (1892).
13. CONN. PuR. AcTs (1931) c. 252, § 601a.
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substantially the same language as before, and provides no oppor-
tunity whatever for a party to obtain information in advance of
the trial regarding any of the matters which his adversary may
bring up against him.
A few other states have strictly adhered to the narrow chancery
rule. These are New Jersey,14 New York,15 South Carolina,10 and
Washington.17 Perhaps Michigan must also be consigned to this
group, subject to possible rescue by Supreme Court interpretation. 8
Since discovery, under this restriction, is of possible advantage
to a party only in so far as 'he alleges affirmative matters in his
pleading, parties are offered a strong inducement to set up fictitious
matters by way of claim or defense, in order to obtain the privilege
of discovery in fields which would otherwise be closed to inquiry.
It was a device well known to the astute practitioners at the English
chancery bar, and its effect in diverting the pleadings from their
proper function of stating the truth is obviously unfortunate.
Many states, on the other hand, have totally abandoned the chan-
cery restrictions upon discovery, and have made it directly and
broadly available as a means of ascertaining from the adverse party
what evidence he proposes to bring forward. In other words, these
states make discovery available not only for attack but for defense
-not merely to aid parties in assembling their own proof but to
protect them from surprise and to relieve them from taking un-
necessary and useless precautions to meet evidence that will never
be offered. These states include Alabama,19 Indiana,20 Iowa,-"
Kentucky, 22 Louisiana, 23 Massachusetts, 24 Missouri,25 Nebraska, 20
New Hampshire, 27 Ohio,28 Texas,29 and Wisconsin,80 and the same
14. N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) p. 4097. Wolters v. Fidelity Trust Co., 65
N. J. L. 130, 46 Atl. 627 (1900).
15. N. Y. C. P. A. (1920) §§ 288-293.
16. See People's Bank v. Helms, 140 S. C. 107, 138 S. E. 622 (1927).
17. WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 1226.
18. MICH. CT. RULES (1931) rule 41.
19. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §§ 7764-7773.
20. IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 383, 465, 564-568.
21. IOWA CODE (1931) § 11185.
22. KY. CODES ANN. (Carroll, 1927) §§ 557, 606(8).
23. LA. CODE OF PRAC. ANN. (Dart, 1932) arts. 347-356.
24. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) e. 231, §§ 61-67.
25. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 1753, 1759.
26. NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) §§ 20-1246, 20-1247.
27. N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 337, § 1.
28. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 11497, 11526.
29. Tnx STAT. (Vernon, 1928) arts. 3738, 3753, 3769.
30. Wis. STAT. (1931) § 326.12.
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practice prevails in the Canadian provinces of Ontario 3 ' and
Quebec.32
Courts have found no difficulty in dealing with unrestricted dis-
covery, and have expressed satisfaction with its results. "There
is no objection that I know why each party should not know the
other's case," said Judge Taft, afterwards Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting as a state judge in
Ohio.33  i
When the objection was urged before the Supreme Court of
Kansas, that unrestricted discovery would permit one to go on a
"fishing expedition" to ascertain his adversary's testimony, the
court answered, through Justice David Brewer, afterwards a Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States--"This is an equal right
of both parties, and justice will not be apt to suffer if each party
knows fully beforehand his adversary's testimony." 3- The Supreme
Court of Missouri declared that it was "a very wise provision of
the code of procedure . . [which permitted] . . . a party . . .
to search the conscience of his adversary" by means of discovery
before trial.3 5
Judge Trippet, applying federal equity rule 58 in the United
States District Court in California, said:
"To say that the plaintiff shall not inquire about the facts that may relate
to the defense is to construe the rule in plain derogation of its language
and purpose. . The plain object of this rule is to dispose of issues in
advance of the trial by compelling the parties to make admissions...
There is no reason why the parties should wait until the day of trial and
then bring in witnesses to prove facts that the parties may be compelled
to admit under oath prior to the trial. The truth is always the truth,
and telling the truth will not hurt anyone, except in so far as he ought
to be hurt." 36
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, referring to the statute
authorizing unrestricted examination of the opposite party before
trial, said:
"It is earnestly insisted that the right given by subsection 8 of section
606, if interpreted according to the contention of appellant, is liable to great
abuse; that it will enable the party to find out his opponent's evidence
31. ONT. CoxsoL. RuLEs OF PRAc. (1928) rules 327-347.
32. QUE. CODE OF CiV. PRC. (Curran, 1922) §§ 286-290.
33. Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 809, 812 (1887).
34. In re Abeles, 12 Kan. 451, 453 (1874).
35. Tyson v. Farm & Rome Savings & Loan Ass'n, 156 Mo. 588, 594, 57
S. W. 740, 741-742 (1900).
36. Quirk v. Quirk, 259 Fed. 597, 598-599 (1919).
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in advance of the trial. As, however, the right is given to each party,
they will both be on terms of equality; and as it is to be presumed that
neither will offer any evidence other than the exact facts and truth of
the case, we do not see how either could be prejudiced." 37
Judge Woolsey, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, criticizing the federal practice as
to discovery, said:
"In view of several illuminating experiences which I have had in cases
pending in the English courts, I feel hospitable to every form of inter-
locutory discovery. . . The rationale of this attitude is, of course, not
only that the court wants to know the truth, but also that it is good for
both parties to learn the truth far enough ahead of the trial not only to
enable them to prepare for trial, but also to enable them to decide whether
or not it may be futile to proceed to trial." 38
Far from encouraging perjury, unrestricted mutual discovery has
been found by experience to be one of the greatest preventives of
perjury.3 9 The party is examined early, while his memory is fresh,
before he has had time to work out a protective scheme of fictitious
circumstances, and while it is still comparatively easy to check up
on his testimony to ascertain how far it may vary from the truth.
Coaching of the witness by counsel in preparation for the discovery
examination is much less common than coaching for the trial, so
that the testimony is more spontaneous. After the testimony has
once been taken, and a copy filed or lodged with examining counsel,
it is impossible for it to be changed to bolster up the case. This
has been conspicuously demonstrated in Massachusetts, where the
narrow chancery rule was formerly in force but was gradually
enlarged under both judicial decisions and liberal legislation until
discovery before trial has become as broad as examination at the
trial itself-an evolution extending through seventy years, from
Wilson v. Webber 40 in 1854, to Cutter v. Cooper 4' in 1920.
Furthermore, discovery which is restricted to the case of the
party asking for it, can never serve as a basis for a summary
judgment in cases where there is no defense; whereas unrestricted
discovery, by disclosing the want of any defense, offers a most satis-
factory method of giving the plaintiff a final judgment without
37. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Williams, 129 Ky. 515, 521, 112 S. W.
651, 653 (1908).
38. Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equipment Corp., 46 F. (2d) 319-320 (1931).
39. Ragland's recent field studies in the use of discovery clearly demonstrated
this. See RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFon TRIAL (1932) 124-125.
40. 2 Gray 558 (1854).
41. 234 Mass. 307, 125 N. E. 634 (1920).
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sending the case to trial. Summary judgments are of immense
value to creditors in collecting liquidated claims, since they reduce
the time consumed by litigation to a small fraction of that required
when cases follow the regular course. England has demonstrated
the great advantages of this practice, for her judicial statistics show
about four times as many summary judgments rendered as those
rendered after the trial of issues.- Their use is rapidly growing
in American jurisdictions where the practice has been introduced.
In New York the applications for summary judgments rose from
174 to 700 per year during the first three years after they were
authorized.43 On March 14, 1932, the New York summary judg-
ment rule was so greatly enlarged in its scope that it will be pos-
sible, in the opinion of officers of the court, to increase by fifty
per cent the amount of litigation which the same number of judges
are able to dispose of." In the city of Detroit 409 summary judg-
ments were rendered in eight months, from August 1, 1930, to
March 31, 1931, as compared with 1834 judgments rendered after
trial, showing that about 1 case in 5 was disposed of by summary
judgment.45
By the general use of unrestricted discovery in cases based on
liquidated demands, an immediate identification and segregation
would be possible of all claims to which there was no valid defense,
and this whole group of cases could be at once disposed of with-
out further time, trouble or expense.
Methods of Modern Discovery
It is safe to say that the interrogating part of the equity bill
for relief, as well as the entire bill for discovery, has practically
disappeared from our system of law.4 6 In all but a very few states
they have been entirely supplanted by motions or notices for dis-
covery.47 But the device by which the investigation was prosecuted,
42. CIvIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS FOR ENGLAND AND WALES (1930) 16.
43. Edward R. Finch, address in 49 Ar. BAR ASS'N REP. (1924) 588, 593.
44. Address by Presiding Justice Edward R. Finch, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York, delivered before the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York on May 14, 1932, p. 1.
45. Figures obtained by the Judicial Council of Michigan (unpublished).
46. 1 PoAIEoY, EQUITY JUPISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905) §§ 83, 193, 209; DuFEE,
CASES ON EQUrrY (1928) 72, n. 10; LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING (1877) § 64;
VAN ZILE, EQuITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1904) § 45.
47. The ancient methods of equity are preserved by statute in Illinois.
REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 22, §§ 22-26; Mlaine, Ruv. STAT. (1930) C. 91,
§ 45; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 373. They are doubtless still thereotically
available in states which have not abolished the formal distinctions between
actions at law and suits in equity.
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namely, the written interrogatory, has been somewhat more suc-
cessful in retaining its reputation of respectability. It is the exclu-
sive method available in about half a dozen states, 48 and is an
alternative method in a dozen more.49
But a new method, unknown to the chancery practice, has entered
the field. This is the oral examination by deposition. It has be-
come permissible in the dozen states last referred to as an alterna-
tive to interrogatories, and it has become the exclusive method in
about twenty-seven states.50 It is obvious, therefore, that interro-
gatories have not been able to withstand the competition of the oral
examination.
48. Delaware, REv. CODE (1915) § 4052; Connecticut, PuB. ACTS (1931) c.
252, § 601a; Illinois, CHICAGO MUNICIPAL COURT ACT (1905) § 32; Louisiana,
CODE OF PRAc. ANN. (Dart, 1932) arts. 347-356; Massachusetts, GEN. LAwS
(1932) c. 231, §§ 61-67; Texas, STAT. (Vernon, 1928) arts. 3738, 3752, 3789.
49. Alabama, CODE (Michie, 1928) §§ 7764-7773; Arkansas, Dia. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 1248; Florida, CoinP. LAWS (1927) §§ 4405-4407;
Georgia, CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§ 4543-4554; Indiana, ANN. STAT. (Burns,
19.26) §§ 564-568, 383; Iowa, CODE (1931) § 11185; Kentucky, CODE ANN.
(Carroll, 1927) §§ 557, 606(8), 140-143; Maine, REv. STAT. (1930) c. 121, §
4; Mississippi, CODE ANN. (1930) § 1538; New Jersey, CoMp. STAT. (1910) p.
4097, 4098 (as amended, LAws (1924) c. 93, p. 193); Tennessee, CODE: (Williams,
1932) §§ 9868-9878, 9806; Virginia, CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §§ 6225, 6236;
Washington, COmP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§ 1225-1230, Sup. Ct. rule 18
(150 Wash. xxxvii, 1929); Wisconsin, STAT. (1929) c. 326, § 12; Wyoming,
ComtP. STAT. ANN. (1920) §§ 5689-5691, 5831-5832.
50. Arizona, CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4444; California, CODE OF CIV.
PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 2021; Colorado, CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1923) § 376;
Idaho, CoMoP. STAT. (1919) § 8006; Kansas, Ruv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 2819-
2821 (but see In re Davis, 38 Kan. 408, 16 Pac. 790 (1888), limiting the rule of
In re Abeles, supra note 34, which had allowed this statute to be liberally used
for discovery before trial); Maryland, ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 35, § 21;
Michigan, CT. RULES (1931) rule 41; Minnesota, STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9820;
Missouri, REV. STAT. (1929) §§ 1753, 1759; Montana, REv. CODE (Choate, 1921) §
10645; Nebraska, CoMp. STAT. (1929) §§ 20-1246, 20-1247 (liberally construed in
Dogge v. State, 21 Nebr. 272, 31 N. W. 929 (1887)); Nevada, Comp. LAWS
(Hillyer, 1929) § 9001; New Hampshire, PuB. LAws (1926) c. 337, § 1; New
Mexico, STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) c. 45, § 101; New York, Civ. PRAc ACT
(1920) §§ 288-293, 295-296; North Carolina, CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§
899-907; North Dakota, Comp. LAwS ANN. (1913) §§ 7862-7870; Ohio, CODE
Throckmorton, 1930) §§ 11497, 11526; Oklahoma, CoMP. STAT. ANN. (Bunn,
1921) §§ 612, 613 (narrowly constructed in Guinan v. Readdy, 79 Okl. 111, 191
Pac. 602 (1920)); Oregon, CODE ANN. (1930) c. 9, § 1503; Pennsylvania, STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 28, § 5 (narrowly construed in International Coal l.
Co. v. Pa. Rr. Co., 214 Pa. St. 469, 63 Atl. 880 (1906)); Rhode Island, GEN.
LAws (1923) c. 342, § 22; South Carolina, CODE OF LAWS (1932) §§ 690-698, as
amended, LAws (1923) c. 122; South Dakota, Coip. LAWS (1929) §§ 2713-2716;
Utah, CoMP. LAWS (1917) § 7178; Vermont, GEN. LAWS (1917) § 1910; West
Virginia, CODE (1931) c. 57, art. 4, § 1.
DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL
In actual effectiveness interrogatories are far inferior to the oral
examination. Their defects are quite obvious. In the first place,
they give the party to whom they are addressed more time to study
their effect, which furnishes a better opportunity to frame pro-
tective answers which conceal or evade. In the next place, as a
means of forcing a specific, detailed and thorough disclosure from
a reluctant party, there is a tendency for the interrogatories to
grow in number, complexity and variety of form, so as to call for
as many aspects of the proof as possible, with the result that they
often become difficult to administer. Cases have been reported
where more than two thousand interrogatories were employed. 5'
To meet this sort of abuse, the questions must either be authorized
by court order or there must be an arbitrary limit to their number,
both of which methods of dealing with the matter are unsatis-
factory.
But there is a third and much more serious weakness in the use
of written interrogatories. To draw up a series of questions and
present them all at once to be answered, is far less searching than
to present questions one at a time, framing each succeeding question
on the basis of prior answers given. Answers usually suggest lines
of further inquiry, which often lead to the most important dis-
closures. This is, of course, the chief reason for the effectiveness
of oral cross-examination. By submitting a complete set of inter-
rogatories, prepared in advance, the party seeking discovery entirely
loses this enormous advantage in eliciting the truth.
Bentham long ago pointed out this inherent defect in what he
called epistolary interrogation. He says:
"Within the path marked out by this string [of questions] the operations
. . . are confined; so that if from the respondent on any occasion an
answer happens to come out which has not been foreseen . . . and not
having been foreseen . . . cannot have had a correspondent interrogatory
deduced from it, . . . the benefit deducible . . from the oral mode,
is . . . lost."2
To illustrate his point he presents the well known case from the
Apocryphal Scriptures, of Susanna and the Elders,63 paraphrasing
and analysing it as follows:
"Defendant Susanna committed adultery with a man in that garden, said
the two mendacious elders. Under what tree? said defendant's counsel,
Daniel. Being examined apart,--Under a mastic tree, answered the one;
51. 1 REPORT, MASS. JUD. COUNCM (1925) 42.
52. 2 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827) 152.
53. APOCRYPHA, HIsToRY OF SUSANNA, verses 51-61.
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under a holme tree, answered the other. Under what tree it was com-
mitted, or whether under any, supposing it was committed, was nothing
to the purpose; nor, had a string of interrogatories been drawn up by
Susanna's counsel, was it much to be expected that by the draughtsman
the circumstances of the tree should have been thought of, nor conse-
quently that anything would have been said about it in the interrogatories.
Had even the first answer been forseen, and an opposite interrogatory
grounded on it, the foresight would hiardly have extended so far as the
second; of the second, still less likely so far as a third; and so on." 54
It is further to be observed that this method, while hampering
the examiner in effectively directing and pursuing his investigation,
also offers special aid to the deponent in concealing his case. This
results from the circumstance that he is informed in advance ex-
actly how far the inquiry is to go, what facts the interrogator knows
about, as evidenced by his questions, and what facts he is ignorant
of, as evidenced by his silence.
In view of these limitations upon the effectiveness of written
interrogatories, it is evilent that they are not well adapted for the
purpose of a general examination. It is only when the facts sought
are few, formal and isolated, that this method can be satisfactorily
employed. So long as the discovery is restricted to the case of the
examiner, and he is not permitted to inquire into the case of his
adversary, the facts sought by discovery will usually be few, formal
and isolated, and written interrogatories will perhaps serve reason-
ably well. For a small task a feeble instrument may suffice. But
if discovery is to involve a thorough inquiry into the vital and highly
controversial phases of the case, resort must be had to an oral
examination. It is apparent that the two aspects of the problem
of discovery, namely its scope and its methods, are intimately con-
nected. One depends to a considerable degree upon the other, and
both should be dealt with together.
Massachusetts undertook to broaden the scope of discovery while
retaining the ancient interrogatory method, with a resulting dis-
crepancy between the authorized extent of the investigation and
the capacity of the machinery for doing the work. New York
retained the narrow limits of equity, but introduced the new method
of oral examination, as a result of which the effectiveness of the
method constantly outruns the limits placed upon its use, causing an
enormous amount of technical litigation over the application of the
rules. 5  Connecticut has at least maintained a proper correlation
54. 2 BENTHAM, op. cit. 8mpra note 52, at 153.
55. To compel litigants to observe the limitations on the scope of the
questions, the New York practice requires the party to set forth in his notice of
deposition the matters upon which he desires to examine his adversary, and the
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between scope and method, for it has changed neither. And this is
true in a number of other states, either generally or in so far as
interrogatories are in fact used. 0
But it is also possible to preserve that correlation by changing
both, authorizing a discovery as broad in its scope as the trial itself,
and providing the same method of examination which is employed in
trial practice. This is the solution which has been found for the
problem in a group of jurisdictions of which Wisconsin is the most
conspicuous example.57  Discovery has by this means become a
widely used system of pre-trial procedure which has profoundly
affected the administration of justice.
latter is allowed to contest the propriety of any of these matters by a motion
to vacate the notice, specifying in such motion the grounds relied upon and
supporting it by affidavits. N. Y. C. P. A. (Clevinger, 1932) § 281; RULES,
124. This permits interlocutory litigation to an almost unlimited extent in
determining the propriety of proposed subjects of examination.
56. New Jersey belongs in this group. See Wolters v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
65 N. J. L. 130, 46 Atl. 627 (1900); Watkins v. Cope, 34 N. J. L. 143, 86 At].
545 (1913); Neske v. Burns, 8 N. J. Misc. 160, 149 At. 761 (1930). So, also
South Carolina. See People's Bank v. Helms, 140 S. C. 107, 138 S. E. 622
(1927); U. S. Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co., 153 S. C. 56, 150 S. E. 347
(1929). The same is true of Washington. See Hill v. Hill, 126 Wash. 560,
561, 219 Pac. 18 (1923); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Lotta Miles Tire Co.,
139 Wash. 159, 245 Pac. 921 (1926).
57. Other jurisdictions belonging in this group include Indiana, Kentucky,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Ontario and Quebec. See RAGLAND,
op. cit. supra note 39, at 124 et seq.
